Abstract One of the ultimate goals of cryptography researchers is to construct a (secrete-key) block cipher which has the following ideal properties: (1) The cipher is provably secure, (2) Security of the cipher does not depend on any unproved hypotheses, (3) The cipher can be easily implemented with current technology, and (4) All design criteria for the cipher are made public. It is currently unclear whether or not there really exists such an ideal block cipher. So to meet the requirements of practical applications, the best thing we can do is to construct a block cipher such that it approximates the ideal one as closely as possible. In this paper, we make a signi cant step in this direction. In particular, we construct several block ciphers each of which has the above mentioned properties (2), (3) and (4) as well as the following one: (1 0 ) Security of the cipher is supported by convincing evidence. Our construction builds upon profound mathematical bases for information security recently established in a series of excellent papers.
Motivations and Summary of Results
Data Encryption Standard (DES) designed by IBM about fteen years ago is the rst modern (secrete-key) block cipher whose algorithm is publicly available NBS] . It is a kind of product ciphers with Lucifer as its direct predecessor FNS] K].
A little more speci cally, both DES and Lucifer consist of 16 rounds of Feistel-type transformations (FTT's) which are invented by and named (by us) after Feistel. From the beginning of DES, however, there had a lot of controversy about its security, and especially, about its design criteria K] which have been classi ed by NSA and its designer IBM. Many computer scientists and cryptography experts were concerned about the possibilities that DES may possess weaknesses only NSA and IBM are aware of, and that trap-doors may have been inserted into the S-boxes of DES which would give a cryptoanalytic advantage to a knowledgeable party. For these reasons, a great amount of e ort has been invested in attempting to break the cipher, or to nd its weaknesses. And many researchers have tried revealing the myths around the design criteria.
In their nice paper LR], Luby and Racko showed that DES would be provably secure if its f-functions were secure pseudorandom ones. Unfortunately, the ffunctions of DES cannot be secure in any reasonable sense. In the same paper, Luby and Racko proved also a result about FTT's: A function consisting of three rounds of randomly and independently chosen FTT's, which is in fact a permutation, cannot be e ciently distinguished from a truly random one. This result is very appealing, since it relies on no unproved hypotheses, and more importantly, it suggests that there is an extremely simple constructive method for designing a theoretically secure block cipher which does not rely on any unproved hypotheses. However, it is practically impossible to construct such a cipher, simply because it takes a huge amount of memory to implement the cipher.
Therefore both practical needs and theoretical interest encourage us to seek for an ideal block cipher having the following properties:
(1) The cipher is provably secure, (2) Security of the cipher does not depend on any unproved hypotheses, (3) The cipher can be easily implemented with current technology, and (4) All design criteria for the cipher are made public. It is still an open problem whether or not there really exists such a block cipher. The best thing we can do currently is to construct a block cipher such that it approximates the ideal one as closely as possible.
In this paper, we make a signi cant step in this direction. In particular, we propose a kind of transformations | Generalized Type-2 transformations, and show that it is an excellent building block for cryptosystems. Utilizing this type of transformations, we construct several concrete block ciphers which have the above mentioned properties (2), (3) and (4) as well as the following one:
( 1 The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 de nes terminology used later, reviews one of the main design rules for DES | FTT's, and introduces the result of Luby and Racko on the rule. Section 3 proposes various types of transformations and shows that all these transformations can be used to construct permutations not e ciently distinguishable from a truly random one. Among the transformations, Generalized Type-2 ones are proved to be most preferable. Section 4 constructs a theoretically provably secure block cipher (PSBC) by the use of Generalized Type-2 transformations. Section 5 presents a variant of PSBC. Section 6 proposes four concrete block ciphers based on theoretical results of Sections 2 { 5. We leave detailed and lengthy proofs to Appendices A, B, C and D.
Preliminaries
This section de nes the notions of pseudorandom number generators and pseudorandom function generators, and introduces the result of Luby and Racko on FTT's. Readers who are not interested in the de nitions can jump over Section 2.1.
Pseudorandom Number/Function Generators
For purposes which will become clear later, our notions introduced below are slight generalizations of those given in Y], GGM] and LR], mainly in the following aspect: In contrast to those in Y], GGM] and LR], we will not impose polynomial bound upon the running time of an algorithm realizing a pseudorandom number/function generator or on the size of a (local) statistical test for strings/functions.
Pseudorandom Number Generators
The set of positive integers is denoted by N. By a string we mean a binary string over the alphabet f0; 1g. For each n 2 N, denote by I n the set of all 2 n strings of length n. For s 1 ; s 2 2 I n , let s 1 s 2 denote the bit-wise XOR of the two strings. Denote by H n the set of all 2 n2 n functions and by Sym n the set of all 2 n ! permutations on I n . The composition of two functions f and g in H n , denoted by f g, is de ned by f g(x) = f(g(x)) for all x 2 I n . By x2 R X we mean that x is drawn randomly and uniformly from a nite set X, and by a function in n (or t etc.) we mean, unless otherwise speci ed, a function from N to N.
Let P be a function in n with P(n) > n. A pseudorandom number generator (PNG) is a collection of functions S = fS n j n 2 N g, where each function S n maps correct version of the result is used.
an n-bit string seed into a P(n)-bit string S n (seed) and it can be computed by some deterministic algorithm.
Security (or strength) of PNG's is de ned in terms of local statistical tests for strings.
De nition 1] Let and L be sets of functions in n, and a set of functions from N to 0; 1]. Let P be a function in n with P(n) > n, and let 2 and L 2 L with 0 < L(n) P(n). A family of circuits T s = fT s n j n 2 Ng is called a local ( ; L) statistical test for strings if each T s n is of size (n), 2 and on input an L(n)-bit xed portion of a P(n)-bit string x, outputs a single bit T s n x]. Call the size of T s . Now let S = fS n j n 2 N g be a PNG where S n maps an n-bit string into a P(n)-bit one. We say that
(1) S locally "-passes the test T s if for all su ciently large n, jPrfT s n r] = 1g ? PrfT s n S n (t)] = 1gj < "(n), where r2 R I P(n) , t2 R I n and " 2 ;
(2) S is locally ( ; L; ")-secure if it locally "-passes all ( ; L) tests;
(3) S is locally ( ; L; )-secure if it is locally ( ; L; ")-secure for any " 2 and any ( ; L) 2 L with 0 < L(n) P(n). Especially, a locally ( ; L; )-secure PNG S is said (4) locally (1; L; )-secure if is the set of all functions in n, and (5) strong if, furthermore, L is the in nite set of all polynomials in n and that of all inverse polynomials in n. (An inverse polynomial in n is a function like 1=Q(n) where Q is a polynomial.)
Finally, assume that S = fS n j n 2 N g is a PNG where S n can be computed in deterministic polynomial time in n. Then (6) S is called locally polynomially secure if it is locally ( ; L; )-secure where both and L are the in nite set of all polynomials in n, and that of all inverse polynomials in n. Note that Yao's de nition for polynomial size statistical tests for strings Y] GGM] is obtained from ours by letting P, and L be polynomials in n with P = L. Now assume, as at the end of De nition 1, that S = fS n j n 2 N g is a PNG where S n can be computed in deterministic polynomial time in n. For such a PNG S, Yao de ned that it passes a polynomial size statistical test for strings T s = fT s n j n 2 Ng if for any polynomial P 1 and for all su ciently large n, jPrfT s n r] = 1g ? PrfT s n S n (t)] = 1gj < 1=P 1 (n), where r2 R I P(n) and t2 R I n , and that S is polynomially secure if it passes all polynomial size statistical tests for strings.
Fact] Assume that S = fS n j n 2 N g is a PNG where S n can be computed in deterministic polynomial time in n. Then S is polynomially secure i it is locally polynomially secure.
2 The size of a circuit is the total number of connections in the circuit.
Proof: It is an immediate consequence of Yao's famous theorem on statistical
Here we give a direct proof for it. Let P be a polynomial, and suppose that S n maps an n-bit string into a P(n)-bit one. 
Pseudorandom Function Generators
Let P be an increasing function in n. A pseudorandom function generator (PFG) is a collection of functions F = fF n j n 2 N g, where F n speci es for each P(n)-bit string key, (the description of) a function F n (key) 2 H n that can be computed by some deterministic algorithm. Security of a PFG is de ned in terms of statistical tests for functions, and the latter uses the concept of oracle circuits which are counterparts of often used oracle Turing machines. An oracle circuit C n is an acyclic circuit which contains, in addition to ordinary AND, OR, NOT and constant gates, also a particular kind of gates | oracle gates. Each oracle gate has an n-bit input and an n-bit output, and it is evaluated using some function from H n . The output of C n , a single bit, is denoted by C n f] when a function f 2 H n is used to evaluate the oracle gates. De nition 2] Let and Q be sets of functions in n, and a set of functions from N to 0; 1]. Let 2 and Q 2 Q be two functions with 0 Q(n) < (n). A family of circuits T f = fT f n j n 2 Ng is called a ( ; Q) statistical test for functions where T f n is an oracle circuit which is of size (n) and has Q(n) oracle gates. Let P be an increasing function in n, and F = fF n j n 2 Ng a PFG where F n speci es for each P(n)-bit string key a function F n (key) 2 H n . We say that (1) F "-passes the test T f if for all su ciently large n, jPrfT f n r] = 1g ?
PrfT f n F n (g)] = 1gj < "(n) where r2 R H n , g2 R I P(n) and " 2 .
(2) F is ( ; Q; ")-secure if it "-passes all ( ; Q) tests.
(3) F is ( ; Q; )-secure if it is ( ; Q; ")-secure for any " 2 and any ( ; Q) 2 Q with 0 Q(n) < (n). Especially, (4) a ( ; Q; )-secure PFG F is said (1; Q; )-secure when is the set of all functions in n.
Finally assume that for each n and for each key 2 I P(n) , the function F n (key) can be computed in deterministic polynomial time in n. (This implies that P is a polynomial in n.) Then (5) F is called polynomially secure when it is ( ; Q; )-secure for and Q being the in nite set of all polynomials in n and being the in nite set of all inverse polynomials in n. We are mainly interested in a special kind of PFG's | pseudorandom permutation generators which are invertible. Let P be an increasing function in n. A pseudorandom permutation generator is a pseudorandom function generator F = fF n j n 2 N g, where F n speci es for each P(n)-bit string key a permutation F n (key) 2 Sym n that can be computed by some deterministic algorithm. A pseudorandom permutation generator F = fF n j n 2 N g is called invertible if there is a pseudorandom permutation generator e F = f e F n j n 2 N g such that for each P(n)-bit string key, e F n speci es the inverse of F n (key). Security of (invertible) pseudorandom permutation generators is de ned in exactly the same way as for pseudorandom function generators. FTT Lemma] (Version 1, LR]) Let Q be a polynomial in n and C 2n be an oracle circuit with Q(n) < 2 n oracle gates. Then jPrfC 2n r] = 1g ? PrfC 2n (f 3 ; f 2 ; f 1 )] = 1gj Q(n) 2 2 n ; where r2 R H 2n and f 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 2 R H n .
FTT Lemma is surprising in the sense that it does not depend on any unproved hypotheses. It implies that we can construct as follows a block cipher which does not relying on any assumption and is provably secure against chosen-plaintext attack: Let the length of a plaintext be 2n. Choose randomly and uniformly from H n three functions f 1 ; f 2 and f 3 , and let the enciphering algorithm be (f 3 ; f 2 ; f 1 ) and the deciphering algorithm be the inverse of (f 3 ; f 2 ; f 1 ).
However one soon nds that such an approach is impractical: To make the cipher secure against some trivial attacks such as exhaustive search, 2n must be su ciently large, say 64, i.e., n 32. When n = 32, specifying (f 3 ; f 2 ; f 1 ) takes at least 3 32 2 32 4 10 11 bits, which is infeasible currently and even in the foreseeable future. In other words, there is still a big gap between practically constructing a provably secure block cipher and the nice theory initiated by Luby and Racko . In the following sections we will examine various types of transformations, and ll the gap greatly.
Cryptographically Useful Transformations
This section introduces various types of transformations, and generalizes FTT Lemma in many directions. First we introduce two operations on strings in I kn | the -position left rotation and the -position right rotation. These two operations are denoted by L ( ) rot and R ( ) rot , and de ned as L ( ) Figure 3 .) It is easy to check that 1;i 1;i is the identity transformation on I kn , i.e., 1;i is the inverse of itself. Such a function is usually called an involution K]. Now we see that g 1;i is an invertible permutation on I kn , and its inverse, denoted by e g 1;i , is given by e g 1;i = 1;i R (1) rot :
For f 1 ; f 2 ; : : :; f s 2 H n , de ne 1 (f s ; : : :; f 2 ; f 1 ) = g 1;s g 1;2 g 1;1 : 1 (f s ; : : :; f 2 ; f 1 ) is also an invertible permutation on I kn , and by de nition, its inverse is e 1 (f s ; : : :; f 2 ; f 1 ) = 1;1 R (1 For s function-tuples h 1 ; h 2 ; : : :; h s , de ne 3 (h s ; : : :; h 2 ; h 1 ) = g 3;s g 3;2 g 3;1 : Since both 3;i and L (1) rot are permutations, hence so are g 3;i and 3 (h s ; : : :; h 2 ; h 1 ). For Generalized Type-2 transformations, we have the following theorem, which is crucial to our construction of block ciphers described in Sections 4{6, and can be proved by modifying the proof for Theorem 2. For the other types of generalized transformations we have no results similar to Theorem 2-G. For reasons see Appendix B where many other results are presented.
Theorem 2-G] (Version 1) Let k = 2`, where`2 N, and let be an odd integer in 1; k]. Let Q be a polynomial in n and C kn be an oracle circuit with Q(n) < 2 n oracle gates. Then jPrfC kn r] = 1g ? PrfC kn ( ) 2 (h k+1 ; : : :; h 2 ; h 1 )] = 1gj `2Q(n) 2 2 n ; where r2 R H kn and h i = (f i;1 ; f i;3 ; : : :; f i;k?1 ) with f i;j 2 R H n .
Optimal Transformations
Let E be a permutation consisting of s rounds of randomly chosen Generalized Type-transformations. From Theorem B5 in Appendix B we see that s k + 1 is a necessary condition for E being indistinguishable from a truly random function by all oracle circuits with polynomially many oracle gates. Call a type of transformations optimal if
(1) a permutation E consisting of k + 1 rounds of randomly chosen transformations is indistinguishable from a truly random function by all oracle circuits with polynomially many oracle gates, and (2) the inverse of E can be computed in the same parallel time as E. For a rigorous de nition of optimality, see Appendix C. The following theorem is proved in the same appendix.
Theorem C1] Among all types of transformations discussed in this paper,
2;i with even k and odd , are the only optimal ones.
PSBC | A Provably Secure Block Cipher
Applying the only optimal Generalized Type-2 Transformations we construct a provably secure block cipher (PSBC) in this section.
A Few Observations
As pointed out in S], FTT Lemma remains true even if the number of oracle gates is replaced by Q(n) 2 o(n) S]. Here Q(n) 2 o(n) means that Q(n) 2 f(n) for some f(n), which satis es lim n!1 cf(n) n = 0 for every positive constant c, i.e., f(n) = o(n).
FTT Lemma] (Version 2, S]) Let C 2n be an oracle circuit with Q(n) 2 o(n) oracle gates. Then jPrfC 2n r] = 1g ? PrfC 2n (f 3 ; f 2 ; f 1 )] = 1gj Q(n) 2 2 n ; where r2 R H 2n and f 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 2 R H n .
Schnorr's observation also applies to our Theorem 2-G (Version 1) stated in Section 3. Next we make a few more observations. Let t 2 N and n = d(log t) 1+" e for some " 2 (0; 1], where the logarithm is taken to the base 2. Then for any constants c and " 0 with c > 0 and 0 " 0 < ", we have c log t c(log t) 1+" 0 = o(d(log t) 1+" e) = o(n); and t c = 2 c log t 2 c(log t) 1+" 0 = 2 o(n) : Thus we obtain from Theorem 2-G (Version 2) the following one.
Theorem 2-G] (Version 3) Let k = 2`, where`2 N, and let be an odd integer in 1; k]. Assume that t 2 N, " 2 (0; 1], n = d(log t) 1+" e and Q(t) 2 o(n) is a polynomial in t. (Notice that 2 n = 2 d(log t) 1+" e is quasipolynomial in t.) 3 Let C 2n be an oracle circuit with Q(t) oracle gates. Then jPrfC kn r] = 1g ? PrfC kn ( ) 2 (h k+1 ; : : :; h 2 ; h 1 )] = 1gj `2Q(t) 2 2 n ; where r2 R H kn and h i = (f i;1 ; f i;3 ; : : :; f i;k?1 ) with f i;j 2 R H n .
4 ( ) rot . Notice that when`is odd and =`, there is no need for changing the mapping (or wiring), since L ( ) rot = R ( ) rot in this case.
A Variant of PSBC
The block cipher PSBC described in Section 4 requires quasi-polynomially many memory cells for both enciphering and deciphering procedures. Thus it is practically impossible to realize the cipher.
This section presents a variant of PSBC, in order to pave the way to practically realizable ciphers. The variant is obtained by adding to PSBC a key-expanding part. The key-expanding part stretches a short string into a long one, i.e., is a PNG. The PNG we use is a strong one (see De nition 1), and it is essentially due to Ohnishi and Schnorr O] S]. Recently, interesting PNG's have been proposed by Maurer and Massey MM] , and as suggested by the two authors, these PNG's may serve for our key-expanding purpose.
A Strong Pseudorandom Number Generator
Ohnishi observed that FTT Lemma remains valid even when two independent random functions are available O].
FTT Lemma] (Version 3, O]) Let Q be a polynomial in n, and let C 2n be an oracle circuit with Q(n) First we note that there is a natural one-one correspondence between functions in H n and strings in I n2 n , i.e., a bijection n from H n to I n2 n . The bijection maps a function f 2 H n into the concatenation ofx 2I n f(x), where x ranges over all strings x 2 I n in a predetermined (such as lexicographical) order, and`is the concatenation operation on more than two strings.
By this bijection, (f 2 ; f 2 ; f 1 ) constructed from f 1 ; f 2 2 H n via FTT's yields a function S 2n2 n : I 2n2 n ! I 2n2 2n. S 2n2 n maps a string x = x 1 x 2 where x 1 ; x 2 2 I n2 n , into a string y 2 I 2n2 2n in the follow way: S 2n2 n (x) = 2n ( ( ?1 n (x 2 ); ?1 n (x 2 ); ?1 n (x 1 ))):
Now we describe concretely an algorithm G n computing the function S 2n2 n . The algorithm follows a similar one in S] . (The reader is referred to Figure 8 before going into the details.) We write a string x 2 I 2n2 n as the concatenation of two strings x 1 ; x 2 2 I n2 n , each of which is written as the concatenation of 2 n strings in I n , i.e., x = x 1 x 2 =ì 2I n x 1;iì 2I n x 2;i , where x 1;i ; x 2;i 2 I n : Likewise, we write a string y 2 I 2n2 2n as the concatenation of 2 2n strings in I 2n , i.e., y =ì i .
Let S = fS e(n) je(n) = 2n2 n ; n 2 N g. From S] we know that the PNG S passes all statistical tests for strings which receive at most 2 o(n) bits as input. In our terms, this can be formally stated as follows.
Theorem 4] (Version 1) The PNG S = fS e(n) je(n) = 2n2 n ; n 2 N g is locally (1; L; )-secure where L is the in nite set of functions L in n with L(n) 2 o (n) and that of all inverse polynomials in n.
Proof: A local statistical test for strings T s = fT s n j n 2 Ng, where T s n has a Q(n)( 2 o(n) )-bit input, can be viewed as a statistical test for functions T f = fT f n j n 2 Ng, where T f n has at most Q(n) 2 o(n) oracle gates that are evaluated using a function from H 2n . Thus the theorem is true by FTT Lemma (Version 2) in Section 4.1.
Applying our observation made in Section 4, this theorem can be translated into the following theorem.
Theorem 4] (Version 2) Let n = d(log t) 1+" e, where t 2 N and " 2 (0; 1]. Then the PNG S = fS e(t) j e(t) = e(n) = 2n2 n ; n = d(log t) 1+" e; t 2 N g where S e(t) maps an e(t) = e(n) = 2n2 n -bit string into a 2n2 2n -bit one, is locally (1; L; )-secure where L is the in nite set of all polynomials in t, and that of all inverse polynomials in t. That is to say, S is a strong PNG.
PSBC with Key-Expanding
Let n = d(log t) 1+" e, where t 2 N and " 2 (0; 1]. Let I kn be the plaintext/ciphertext spaces where k = 2`,`2 N, and let be an odd integer in 1; k], s an integer with s k + 2.
The enciphering algorithm consists of two parts: the enciphering part and the key-expanding part (Figure 9 ). The enciphering part, as PSBC, consists essentially of s rounds of Generalized Type-2 transformations. The key-expanding part is an algorithm G m that computes a function Sê (t) from a strong PNG S = fSê (t) jê(t) = 2m2 m ; m = ndlog ne; n = d(log t) 1+" e; t 2 N g and it can expand a 2m2 m -bit input string into a 2m2 2m -bit output string.
The deciphering algorithm is obtained by (1) reversing the portion, which is used by the enciphering part, of the output of the key-expanding part and (2) changing the mapping (or wiring) representing L ( ) rot to the mapping (or wiring) representing R ( ) rot . The following theorem implies that the block cipher PSBC with key-expanding is secure against any polynomial size adversary. It can be proved by making some obvious modi cations on the proof for Theorem 1 of LR].
Theorem 5] Let k = 2`where`2 N, and be an odd integer in 1; k]. Also let t 2 N, " 2 (0; 1], n = d(log t) 1+" e and S = fS m(t) jê(t) = 2m2 m ; m = ndlog ne; n = d(log t) 1+" e; t 2 N g be the above constructed strong PNG. Assume that P and Q are polynomials in t and that C 2n is an oracle circuit with Q(t) oracle gates. Then for any r2 R H kn , for any x2 R Iê (t) , and for any h 1 ; h 2 ; : : : ; h k+1 where h i = (f i;1 ; f i;3 ; : : :; f i;k?1 ) and each f i;j corresponds to a distinct n2 n (= 2 o(m) )-bit portion of the output of Sê (t) 6. Practical Block Ciphers PSBC with key-expanding requires still quasi-polynomial amount of memory to specify an enciphering/deciphering algorithm. In addition, the enciphering/deciphering part uses only an extremely small portion of the output of the key-expanding part.
Experience tells us that concatenating a number of transformations, each of which may not be so cryptographically strong, can produce a very strong one M] . This folklore has recently been proved to be correct by Luby and Racko . See Theorem 2 in the preliminary version of LR] .
Along this guideline, we consider how to modify PSBC with key-expanding so that it is practically secure and can be implemented with current technology. We focus on the following three aspects: the size of a key, the sizes of n and k, and the rounds of transformations.
1. A key should be relatively short to make the cipher easy to be implemented. However to beat back the exhaustive search attack, the key should not be too short. 2. n should not be too large since it takes n2 n bits to specify a random function from H n . However, kn and hence k should be su ciently large, otherwise the cipher is insecure even against the trivial exhaustive search attack. 3. When a relatively short key and a small n are chosen, the strength of the cipher will be signi cantly reduced. An e ective method of resolving the problem is increasing the number of rounds of transformations. The remaining part of this section proposes four example ciphers which we hope are secure enough for practical applications. Main parameters of the ciphers are collected in Table 1 . For completeness, the de nitions of the parameters are summarized below the table.
These parameters are chosen according to the preceding three aspects. In addition, n = 4 and n = 8 are chosen for easier implementation by software and/or hardware. The key-expanding part of each example cipher is realized by the algorithm G m expanding a key of length 2m2 m bits into a long string of length 2m2 2m bits. All output bits of G m are used by the enciphering part.
Notice that in Examples 2 and 3, the output of G m is only half of the bits required by the enciphering part. We take two 2m2 m -bit strings, and use G m to stretch them into 2m2 2m -bit ones. Then we combine the 2m2 2m -bit strings into a 4m2 2m -bit one. A recommended method for combining strings is concatenating them in bit/bits unit. Size of Enciphering Part =` s n 2 n (bits) =` s n 2 n =2 13 (kilo-bytes). s | the number of rounds of Generalized Type-2 transformations applied in the enciphering/deciphering part. n | the length of a substring B i (or C i ). k | (= 2`) the number of substrings B i 's (or C i 's). m | specifying the length, 2m2 m , of an input to G m .
Conclusion
We have investigated various types of transformations, and showed that among them Generalized Type-2 transformations are the most preferable. Two provably secure block ciphers, PSBC and PSBC with key-expanding, have been constructed by the use of Generalized Type-2 transformations. And nally, based on PSBC with key-expanding, practically implementable block ciphers have been presented.
(f i;1 ; f i;3 ; : : :; f i;k?1 ) with f i;j 2 R H n . Proof: Suppose that the Q oracle gates of C kn are numbered by 1; 2; : : :; Q. Also suppose that inputs to the oracle gates are all di erent; otherwise we can construct an oracle circuit C 0 kn such that (1) C 0 kn is functionally equivalent to C kn , (2) the number of oracle gates of C 0 kn is Q and inputs to the oracle gates of C 0 kn are mutually di erent, and (3) the size of C 0 kn is at most as large as the cube of that of C kn (See LR]).
The proof technique used here is essentially the same as that developed in LR] for proving FTT Lemma (called Main Lemma there).
Note that k = 2`and that 2 (h k+1 ; : : :; h 2 ; h 1 ) consists of k + 1 Type-2 transformations, each of which has`independent random functions from H n .
Let be the probability space with sample space I Q(2`+1)`n and the uniform probability distribution. For ! 2 , write it as ! = ! 1 ! 2 ! Q(2`+1)`n .
For each 1 i Q; 1 j 2`+ 1 and odd t with 1 t 2`, de ne a function X i;j;t : ! I n as follows : X i;j;t (!) = ! b+1 ! b+n where b = (j ?1)`+ t?1 2 ]Qn+ (i ? 1)n. There are totally Q(2`+ 1)`such functions. For each 1 j 2`+ 1 and odd t with 1 t 2`, let X j;t (!) = X 1;j;t (!)X 2;j;t (!) X Q;j;t (!).
Let ! 2 be a sample point. For each 1 i Q, replace the ith oracle gate by the following gate P i . Note that the structure of P i is similar to that of 2 (h 2`+1 ; : : :; h 2 ; h 1 ) depicted in Figure 4 .
The input is (B i;1 (!); B i;2 (!); : : :; B i;2`( !)). Rename it as ( i 0;1 ; i 0;2 ; : : :; i 0;2`) .
1:1 : For each odd 1 t 2`, compute u(i; 1; t) = minfdj1 d i; d 0;t = i 0;t g, and let i 1;t = i 0;t+1 X u(i;1;t);1;t (!): 1:2 : Let i 1;2`= i 0;1 , and for each even 1 < t < 2`, let i 1;t = i 0;t+1 : 2:1 : For each odd 1 t 2`, compute u(i; 2; t) = minfdj1 d i; d 1;t = i 1;t g, and let f i 2;t = i 1;t+1 X u(i;2;t);2;t (!)g: 2:2 : Let i 2;2`= i 1;1 , and for each even 1 < t < 2`, let i 2;t = i 1;t+1 :
. . . j:1 : For each odd 1 t 2`, compute u(i; j; t) = minfdj1 d i; d j?1;t = i j?1;t g and let f i j;t = i j?1;t+1 X u(i;j;t);j;t (!)g; j:2 : Let i j;2`= i j?1;1 , and for each even 1 < t < 2`, let i j;t = i j?1;t+1 : . . .
(2`+ 1):1 : For each odd 1 t 2`, compute u(i; 2`+ 1; t) = minfdj1 d i; d 2`;t = i 2`;t g and let f i 2`+1;t = i 2`;t+1 X u(i;2`+1;t);2`+1;t (!)g; (2`+ 1):2 : Let i 2`+1;2`= i 2`;1 , and for each even 1 < t < 2`, let i 2`+1;t = i 2`;t+1 : The output is ( i 2`+1;1 i 2`+1;2 i 2`+1;2`) .
Let B(!) be the output of the circuit C kn when the oracle gates are computed as the above introduced gates P i , and let E(B) be the expectation of B(!). Note that the value of E(B) is equal to the probability that B(!) = 1. Thus, we have E(B) = PrfC kn 2 (h k+1 ; : : :; h 2 ; h 1 )] = 1g:
Now we introduce another kind of gates | P 0 i . Each P 0 i is obtained by replacing the \and let f g" parts of steps 2:1; : : :; j:1; : : :; (2`+ 1):1 in the description of P i by the following ones respectively:
and let fX 0 i;2;t (!) = i 1;t+1 X i;2;t (!); i 2;t = i 1;t+1 X 0 u(i;2;t);2;t (!)g: . . . and let fX 0 i;j;t (!) = i j?1;t+1 X i;j;t (!); i j;t = i j?1;t+1 X u(i;j;t);j;t (!)g:
. . . and let fX 0 i;2`+1;t (!) = i 2`;t+1 X i;2`+1;t (!); i 2`+1;t = i 2`;t+1 X 0 u(i;2`+1;t);2`+1;t (!)g: Let B 0 (!) be the output bit of the circuit C kn when the oracle gates are computed as the gates P 0 i , and let E(B 0 ) be the expectation of B 0 (!). Now we show that E(B) = E(B 0 ). Note that X i;j;t (!) is identically and uniformly distributed, and that i j?1;t+1 does not depend on X i;j;t (!), Thus X 0 i;j;t (!) = i j?1;t+1 X i;j;t (!) is an identically and randomly chosen string from I n . Consequently, E(B) and E(B 0 ) are identical.
Let R i be a gate obtained in the following way: R i is the same as P 0 i except that the output is (X i;2`+1;1 (!); X i;2`;3 (!); X i;2`+1;3 (!); X i;2`;5 (!); X i;2`+1;5 (!); ; X i;2`+1;2`?1 (!); X i;2`;1 (!)): Let A(!) be the output bit of the circuit C kn when the oracle gates are computed as the gates R i , and let E(A) be the expectation of A(!). Like E(B), the value of E(A) is equal to the probability that A(!) = 1. Thus, E(A) = PrfC kn r] = 1g. Now we have a fact : If X j;t (!) are not bad for all 1 j 2`and odd t with 1 t 2`, then A(!) = B 0 (!). The reason is as follows. X 1;t (!) is not bad which implies u(i; 2; t) = i which implies i 2;t = X i;2;t (!). X 2;t (!) is not bad which implies u(i; 3; t) = i which implies i 3;t = X i;3;t (!). ...... X 2`;t (!) is not bad which implies u(i; 2`+1; t) = i which implies i 2`+1;t = X i;2`+1;t (!). These imply that the output of C kn when the oracle gates are computed as the gates R i and the output computed as P 0 i are identical. In other words, A(!) = B 0 (!).
Let g be the set of ! 2 such that X j;t (!) are not bad for all 1 j 2`and odd t with 1 t 2`, and let b = ? g . Denote by ]S the number of elements in the set S. Thus ] b =] =PrfX j;t (!) bad for some 1 j 2`and odd t with 1 t 2`g = 
Appendix B |Minimum Rounds for Security
This appendix discusses minimum rounds for achieving security when a permutation is constructed from some kind of transformations.
(1) Transformations Related to Type-3 ones First we introduce a useful lemma.
Lemma B1] Let P be a subset of H kn . If for any function p 2 P and for any input s = (s i ; s`; s j ) 2 I kn , the output of p takes the form of (: : :; s` ( b s` ); : : :), where 0 i;`; j kn;` 1; i +`+ j = kn, s i 2 I i ; s`2 I`; s j 2 I j and ( b s` ) means that the string does not depend on s`, then there is a simple oracle circuit distinguishing between a function p 2 P and a function randomly and uniformly selected from H kn .
Proof: Our oracle circuit has two oracle gates. It works as follows: Select two strings s 1 = (s i ; s 0`; s j ) and s 2 = (s i ; s 00 ; s j ) from I kn such that s 0`6 = s 00 . Then input s 1 to the rst oracle gate and s 2 to the second oracle gate. Assume the outputs of the two oracle gates are c 1 and c 2 respectively. Our oracle circuit outputs a bit 1 i the XOR of c 1 and c 2 is (: : : ; s 0` s 00 ; : : :).
When the oracle gates are evaluated by a function p 2 P, we have c 1 = (: : : ; s 0` ( b s 0` ); : : :) and c 2 = (: : :; s 00 ( b s 00 ); : : :), respectively. And the XOR of c 1 and c 2 is always (: : : ; s 0` s 00 ; : : :). Thus with probability 1 the oracle circuit outputs 1.
On the other hand, when the oracle gates are evaluated by a function randomly and uniformly selected from H kn , the probability that the XOR of c 1 and c 2 is equal to (: : :; s 0` s 00 ; : : :) is 1 2`.
Recall that for a function-tuple h i = (f i;1 ; f i;2 ; : : :; f i;k?1 ), where f i;j 2 H n , a Type-3 transformation is de ned as g 3;i = L (1) rot 3;i , where 3;i (B 1 ; B 2 ; : : :; B k ) = (B 1 ; B 2 f i;1 (B 1 ); B 3 f i;2 (B 2 ); : : :; B k f i;k?1 (B k?1 ) Let denote the minimum number s at which (h s ; : : :; h 2 ; h 1 ) is secure. Now we are in a position to prove that k + 1, i.e., a necessary condition for (h s ; : : : ; h 1 ; h 1 ) to be secure is that s k + 1.
Theorem B2] (1) k + 1. (2) and then the result is shifted to the (k ? 1)th position. Also note that no substring in the position 1 to the position (k ? 2) of the output of g 3;1 depends on B k . That is, substrings in the position 1 to the position (k ? 2) of the output of g 3;1 take the forms of ( c B k ).
Now B k appears in the (k ? 2)th substring of the output of g 3;2 , in the form of B k ( c B k ), and substrings in the position 1 to the position (k ? 3) of the output of g 3;2 take the forms of ( c B k ). So on, the rst substring of the output of g 3;k?1 , and hence the last substring of the output of g 3;k , is of the form B k ( c B k ). 
Appendix C | Optimal Transformations
In this appendix we examine what kinds of transformations are optimal in a reasonable sense to be de ned below.
The computing procedures for Generalized Type-transformations g ( ) ;i , and hence for ( ) (h s ; : : :; h 2 ; h 1 ), can be represented by acyclic computation graphs. There are three kinds of nodes in a computation graph: input nodes, output nodes and internal nodes. Each internal node in a computation graph represents a generic operation : computing a function f i;j or XORing two strings.
The length of a path between two nodes is de ned as the number of arcs in the path. Now assume that the length of the longest path(s) from input nodes to output nodes in a computation graph is L. ( ) 2 ) = 4(k + 1). Thus we have proved:
Theorem C1] Among all types of transformations discussed in this paper, 
Appendix D | Super-Security
Luby and Racko introduced also the notion of super-secure pseudorandom permutation generators in LR]. (They owed the notion to O. Goldreich.) Intuitively, a pseudorandom permutation generator is super-secure if no super-oracle circuit can tell a permutation randomly speci ed by the generator from a randomly and uniformly chosen one. A super-oracle circuit is an oracle circuit with two kinds of oracle gates. The rst is called the normal oracle gates which are evaluated using some permutation, and the second the inverse oracle gates which are evaluated using the inverse of the permutation.
When a secure pseudorandom permutation generator is used to construct a block cipher, the cipher is secure against the chosen plaintext attack, but not necessarily secure against the chosen plaintext/ciphertext attack. When a supersecure pseudorandom permutation generator is used to construct a block cipher, the cipher is secure against the chosen plaintext/ciphertext attack LR].
Luby and Racko showed that functions consisting of 4 rounds of FTT's are super-secure. In this appendix we generalize the result to the following one.
Theorem D1] Let k = 2`, where`2 N, and let be an odd integer gate. Assume the two corresponding outputs are C = (C 1 ; C 2 ; : : :; C i 2 ; : : :; C k ) and C 0 = (C 0 1 ; C 0 2 ; : : :; C 0 i 2 ; : : :; C 0 k ) respectively. Now let C 00 = (C 00 1 ; C 00 2 ; : : :; C 00 i 2 ; : : :; C 00 k ) where C 00 i 2 = C i 2 B j B 0 j and C 00 i = C i for all i 6 = i 2 . Then input C 00 to the inverse oracle gate. Assume that the output of the inverse oracle gate is B 00 = (B 00 1 ; B 00 2 ; : : :; B 00 e ; : : :; B 00 k ). The super-oracle circuit C kn outputs 1 i B 00 e = B e C i 1 C 0 i 1 . Whenever ( ) 2 (h s ; : : :; h 2 ; h 1 )/its inverse are used to evaluate the oracle gates, C kn outputs 1 with probability 1; and whenever a random permutation/its inverse over I kn are used to evaluate the oracle gates, C kn outputs 1 with probability 1 2 n . (2) When s k + 2, super-security for ( ) 2 (h s ; : : :; h 2 ; h 1 ) can be proved in a similar way as for proving Theorem 2.
